

Computer and Network Security

Lecture 22: TLS / Protocols

COMP-5370/6370
Fall 2025



The TLS Protocol





**IN THE YEAR 2023, NO
PUBLIC-FACING WEBSITE
SHOULD NOT SUPPORT &
UPGRADE TO HTTPS.**

Key Distribution Problem



Key Distribution Problem is the generic name used to reference real-world challenges from a nominally simple need.

- Is well-known and widely maligned
- Directly applicable to shared secrets
- Also applicable to non-secret provenance

Intermediate Certificate

Root Certificate

qKQ	Subject Name	
eIF	Country	US
fzc	State/Province	New Jersey
MBU	Locality	Jersey City
EgU	Organization	The USERTRUST Network
	Common Name	USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
	Issuer Name	
	Country	US
	State/Province	New Jersey
	Locality	Jersey City
	Organization	The USERTRUST Network
	Common Name	USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

Root Certificate Authorities (Root CAs)



Certificate Manager

Your Certificates

People

Servers

Authorities

You have certificates on file that identify these certificate authorities

Certificate Name	Security Device
AC Camerfirma S.A.	
Chambers of Commerce Root - 2008	Builtin Object Token
Global Chambersign Root - 2008	Builtin Object Token
AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287	
Camerfirma Chambers of Commerce R...	Builtin Object Token
Camerfirma Global Chambersign Root	Builtin Object Token
ACCV	
ACCRAIZ1	Builtin Object Token
Actalis S.p.A./03358520967	
Actalis Authentication Root CA	Builtin Object Token

View...

Edit Trust...

Import...

Export...

Delete or D...

Keychains

login

Local Items

System

System Roots

Category

All Items

Passwords

Secure Notes

My Certificates

Keys

Certificates

Certificate

VRK Gov. Root CA

Root certificate authority

Expires: Monday, December 18, 2023 at 07:51:08 CST

This certificate is valid

Name	Kind	Expires	Keychain
AAA Certificate Services	certificate	Dec 31, 2028 at 5:59:59...	System Roots
AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM	certificate	Dec 31, 2029 at 6:00:00...	System Roots
Actalis Authentication Root CA	certificate	Sep 22, 2030 at 6:22:02...	System Roots
AddTrust Class 1 CA Root	certificate	May 30, 2020 at 5:38:31...	System Roots
AddTrust External CA Root	certificate	May 30, 2020 at 5:48:38...	System Roots
Admin-Root-CA	certificate	Nov 10, 2021 at 1:51:07 AM	System Roots
AffirmTrust Commercial	certificate	Dec 31, 2030 at 8:06:06...	System Roots
AffirmTrust Networking	certificate	Dec 31, 2030 at 8:08:24...	System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium	certificate	Dec 31, 2040 at 8:10:36...	System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium ECC	certificate	Dec 31, 2040 at 8:20:24...	System Roots
Amazon Root CA 1	certificate	Jan 16, 2038 at 6:00:00...	System Roots
Amazon Root CA 2	certificate	May 25, 2040 at 7:00:00...	System Roots
Amazon Root CA 3	certificate	May 25, 2040 at 7:00:00...	System Roots
Amazon Root CA 4	certificate	May 25, 2040 at 7:00:00...	System Roots
ANF Global Root CA	certificate	Jun 05, 2033 at 12:45:38...	System Roots
Apple Root CA	certificate	Feb 09, 2035 at 3:40:36...	System Roots
Apple Root CA - G2	certificate	Apr 30, 2039 at 1:10:09 PM	System Roots
Apple Root CA - G3	certificate	Apr 30, 2039 at 1:19:06 P...	System Roots
Apple Root Certificate Authority	certificate	Feb 09, 2025 at 6:18:14...	System Roots
ApplicationCA2 Root	certificate	Mar 12, 2033 at 9:00:00...	System Roots
Atos TrustedRoot 2011	certificate	Dec 31, 2030 at 5:59:59...	System Roots
Autoridad de...nal CIF A62634068	certificate	Dec 31, 2030 at 2:38:15...	System Roots
Autoridad de...Estado Venezolano	certificate	Dec 17, 2030 at 5:59:59...	System Roots


Compromised Root CA



WIRED

SUBSCRIBE

DigiNotar Files for Bankruptcy in Wake of Devastating Hack



A Dutch certificate authority that suffered a major hack attack this summer has been unable to recover from the blow and filed for bankruptcy this week.

Intermediate Certificate

Subject Name	_____
Country	US
	36849
State/Province	Alabama
Locality	Auburn University
	300 Lem Morrison Drive
Organization	Auburn University
Organizational Unit	Office of Information Technology
Common Name	auburn.edu

Issuer Name	_____
Country	US
State/Province	MI
Locality	Ann Arbor
Organization	Internet2
Organizational Unit	InCommon
Common Name	InCommon RSA Server CA

Fp0	Subject Name	_____
VN3	Country	US
79u	State/Province	MI
cND	Locality	Ann Arbor
	Organization	Internet2
	Organizational Unit	InCommon
	Common Name	InCommon RSA Server CA
Up7	Issuer Name	_____
VNK	Country	US
AT4	State/Province	New Jersey
8PR	Locality	Jersey City
iQY	Organization	The USERTRUST Network
SZ7	Organizational Unit	USERTRUST RSA Certification Authority
XB1	Common Name	USERTRUST RSA Certification Authority
qS3		
Vxy		
L6K		
jJx		

[illegible]

Intermediate Certificate

Root Certificate

Subject Name _____

Country US

State/Province New Jersey

Locality Jersey City

Organization The USERTRUST Network

Common Name USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

Issuer Name _____

Country US

State/Province New Jersey

Locality Jersey City

Organization The USERTRUST Network

Common Name USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

Malicious

Subject Name	-----
Country	US
State/Province	MI
Locality	Ann Arbor
Organization	Internet2
Organizational Unit	InCommon
Common Name	InCommon RSA Server CA

MDAg	Subject Name	
dHkx		
EOYI	Country	US
AQEF		
fhRE		36849
Hxqe		
ZAcg	State/Province	Alabama
dOAK		
Ngbr	Locality	Auburn University
d49e		
MAAC		300 Lem Morrison Drive
BwME		
AQUR	Organization	Auburn University

Certificate Transparency



- When issuing an SSL cert, CA must notify 3rd parties of the details of the certificate
- Will eventually be a repository of all currently-valid SSL certificates.

Certificate Transparency Search Tool

Search: auburn.edu ☐ Include expired certificates ☐ Include subdomains (partial match)

[Copy Link to These Results](#)

Export to Excel Export to CSV

Issuer Name	Serial Num...	Subject CN	Valid F...	Valid To	Validat...	Signing Algori...	Key	Link
COMODO CA Limited (4)								
COMODO CA Limited	a7fd44fd38c48f1...	ssl712430.cloudflaressl.c...	2019-09-08	2020-03-16	non-EV	SHA-256	RSA-2048	Copy Link
COMODO CA Limited	beeeabf7d734fa...	ssl712431.cloudflaressl.c...	2019-09-08	2020-03-16	non-EV	ecdsa-with-Sha256	EC-256	Copy Link
COMODO CA Limited	a7fd44fd38c48f1...	ssl712430.cloudflaressl.c...	2019-09-08	2020-03-16	non-EV	SHA-256	RSA-2048	Copy Link
COMODO CA Limited	beeeabf7d734fa...	ssl712431.cloudflaressl.c...	2019-09-08	2020-03-16	non-EV	ecdsa-with-Sha256	EC-256	Copy Link
Internet2 (1)								
Internet2	31aae6e133d16...	auburn.edu	2017-04-18	2020-04-17	non-EV	SHA-256	RSA-2048	Copy Link


Computer and Network Security

Lecture 22: Other Security Protocols

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Fall 2025



TLS 1.3





- Single round-trip required for full connection
 - ~100ms latency
- May require additional due to optimistic contents

TLS 1.3 (Early Data)



- TLS 1.3 can send an HTTP request in the first message
 - “early data”
 - “0RTT request”
- Request is protected by previous session’s key material
- Can (but shouldn’t) be processed immediately





The **QUIC** (“**quick**”) protocol is a UDP-based alternative to TLS designed by Google for experimenting with new ideas.

- Similar to TLS but some major changes
- Heavily contributed to features and structure of HTTP/2 and TLSv1.3
- HTTP/3 uses QUIC instead of TLS
 - Standardized in June 2023 (RFC 9114)



The **Secure Shell (SSH)** protocol is a widely-used secure channel optimized for terminal-access and administration.

- Significantly different approach from TLS
- Mandatory bi-directional authentication
- PKI-style authentication exists but rarely used
 - Does **NOT** use the same root CAs as TLS
- Almost always Trust on First Use (TOFU) authentication

Trust On First Use



Trust On First Use (TOFU) is an alternative solution to the key-distribution problem where keys are “pinned” after initial connection.

- Similar to HSTS in security trade-offs
 - Assume the very-first connection is safe
 - As long as key doesn't change, not MitM
- Can be used in almost any protocol but mostly limited to SSH

TLS vs. SSH



TLS

- Client rarely authenticated
- Almost always PKI for auth (CAs + SSL certs)
- Lots of optimization for static(ish) content
- Large number of connections to large number of hosts
 - Minimal/Optimized setup

SSH


- Forced Bi-directional authentication
- Almost always auth via manual-config + TOFU
- Focused on real-time & bi-directional data
- Small number of connections to small number of hosts
 - Very verbose setup



A **Virtual Private Network (VPN)** is a *logical* concept through which a remote client appears on the local network by use of a multiplexed secure channel.


- Many different protocols can be used

Decoupled Design



- Attempted to explicitly decouple responsibilities
- Can mix-and-match protocols for needs
 - Think of as a “security protocol stack”
- Revolves around “Security Associations”

Types of VPNs



VPN Specifications



R. Atkinson
Naval Research Laboratory
August 1995


**IP Security
Document Roadmap**



A **Virtual Private Network (VPN)** is a *logical* concept through which a remote client appears on the local network by use of a multiplexed secure channel.

- Many different protocols can be used
- IKE+IPSec is a common implementation
- Can connect two remote-networks as 1

Site-to-Site VPN



- VPN is handled by network nodes
 - *“A long ethernet cable”*
- Clients are unaware of its existence due to being handled by network infrastructure




A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a *logical* concept through which a remote client appears on the local network by use of a multiplexed secure channel.

- Many different protocols can be used
- IKE+IPSec is a common implementation
- Can connect two remote-networks as 1
- Can be used on a client-server construction



Remote-Access VPN



- The type you are normally accustomed to thinking about


What are VPN Trade-Offs?



**What are the advantages
and disadvantages of
using a VPN?**


(discuss)

VPN Upsides




- Allow obfuscation of client's source
 - Source-ASN may leak identity
 - Hide the client's geolocation

VPN Upsides




- Mixes client's traffic with all other users of VPN's traffic

VPN Upsides




- Prevents client-side “last mile” network attacks
 - Wifi sniffing
 - ISP interference

VPN Downsides




- Large amount of trust in VPN server
 - See all traffic
 - Can inject traffic

VPN Downsides




- Privacy properties are often **greatly** exaggerated

VPN Downsides



- Server-side network attacker can dox
- Server-side implementation can be *forced to* dox

VPN Downsides



BLEEPINGCOMPUTER


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Cyberstalking Suspect Arrested After VPN Providers Shared Logs With the FBI



By [Catalin Cimpanu](#)

October 7, 2017 08:55 AM 10



VPN providers often advertise their products as a method of surfing the web anonymously, claiming they never store logs of user activity, but a recent criminal case shows that at least some, do store user activity logs.


VPN Downsides




Mix Networks



Mix Networks (Mix-Nets) are a type of high-latency anonymous network which relies on bounces among nodes with other messages for protections.




Mix-Nets



- Client sends message to network
- Nodes delay random amount of time
- Nodes sends random selection of nodes
- Repeat

Mix-Net Downsides



- Extremely Slow
- Require large networks and high through-put
- Non-linear scaling

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